Course Outline and Schedule
|
DATE
|
TOPIC
|
REFERENCE
|
HOMEWORK
|
|
9/3
|
Introduction to the course |
|
|
|
9/5
|
Working Effectively in Groups |
In-class | |
|
9/8
|
Thinking
Critically: Grandma's Cookies |
In-class |
Handout |
|
9/10
|
Social
Choice: The Impossible Dream Majority Rule; Condorcet's Method; Plurality Voting; |
Chapter 9: 9.1 - 9.2 | Page 364-366/ Using Plurality and Condorcet Methods Only: 8, 10, 12, 14 |
|
9/12
|
No class |
|
|
| 9/15 | Social
Choice: The Impossible Dream Borda Count, Hare, Sequential pair-wise, plurality run-off | 9.2 | Page 364-366/7, 8 (b,c,d), 10 (b,c,d), 12 (b,c,d), 14 (b,c,d), 16, 18, 20, 24, 26 |
| 9/17 | Social
Choice: The Impossible Dream Arrow's Theorem, Approval Voting; | 9.3 - 9.4 | |
| 9/19 | Social
Choice: The Manipulability of Voting Systems | Chapter 10 through 10.2 | |
| 9/22 | Social Choice: The Manipulability of Voting Systems | Chapter 10 through 10.2 | |
| 9/24 | Social Choice: The Manipulability of Voting Systems | Chapter 10 through 10.3 | Due Friday: Page 387-388/ 12, 14, 16. |
| 9/26 | Weighted Voting Systems | Chapter 11.1 |